Armenian Genocide International Recognition: 1915–2009 Thesis

Turkey was the first country to recognize Armenia as an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But despite this fact and the years that have passed since then, diplomatic relations between the two countries have still not been established. The Turkish side refuses to open its borders or establish diplomatic relations with Armenia until Armenia seriously revises its stance on recognizing the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Turkey, and withdraws its accusations against Turkey and Turks of committing genocide against the Armenians during World War I.

Facts have their own language. People must learn to read that language in order to draw lessons from their past. History shows that the past is full of mistakes, and one should neither deny them nor pin them on others. Far more important is to get to the roots and find the causes that led to the horrific events.

Throughout human history one can find many instances of genocide, from ancient times up to the present day. This is especially characteristic of wars of extermination and devastating invasions, conquerors’ campaigns, internal ethnic and religious conflicts, and the formation of colonial empires by European powers. However, it is worth separately examining the term “genocide,” the key concept guiding this work. Genocide is recognized as an international crime. In the Russian Federation, for example, Article 357 of the Criminal Code provides for criminal liability for genocide as a crime against the peace and security of humanity. The term “genocide” was first introduced in 1943 by Polish jurist of Jewish origin Raphael Lemkin, and it received international legal status after World War II, in December 1948, as a term defining the gravest crime against humanity. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UN General Assembly Resolution 260 A(III) of December 9, 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951. According to Article II of the Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

2. To examine the issue of the recognition of the genocide by the broadest strata of society – from ordinary citizens to the political elites of various states. This is the main part of the thesis, which is addressed in the second and third chapters. In those chapters, we have attempted to summarize all the most acute questions related to the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

New historical studies continue to appear on the Armenian Question, the genocide, and its international recognition. Historians of many countries are turning to what many had thought was the pain of one nation – which it is not. The issue is much broader and more important for history. The impunity of the Armenian Genocide had tragic consequences for the Jews who became victims of the Holocaust. Among the consequences of the impunity for this crime one can also include the escalation of acts of genocide in the modern world – the extermination of the population of the state of Biafra declared in January 1970, the mutual slaughter of the Hutu and Tutsi, the massacre of Serbs in Bosnia, the events in Kosovo, etc. All this, in the eyes of the international community, makes it urgent to raise anew the issue of Turkey’s responsibility for the crime it committed.

Particular attention is paid to documents of Russian origin – both those already in scholarly circulation and those uncovered in Russian archives which were restricted or closed in Soviet times. These documents mostly relate to the political history of the Armenian Question. Without studying them, it is impossible to understand what happened to the Treaty of Sèvres and the arbitral award of the U.S. President on the territorial delimitation between the Armenian and Turkish states. The Russian documents are also valuable in the context of the collection’s main theme – establishing the responsibility of the Turkish state for the Armenian Genocide and protecting the rights of the people who became the object of that crime. Documents of international bodies and organizations are of special value as they reflect the collective judgment of the international community.

Also of interest is Armen Markarian’s “Russia and the Armenian Genocide of 1915– 1917”^[4]. This collection of documents includes both materials already known to scholarship and little-known or entirely unknown documents concerning Russia’s policy on the Armenian Question during the genocide years (in the Armenian language). Chronologically, the documents cover the period 1915–1917, when three regimes succeeded each other in Russia: Tsarist, the Provisional Government, and Soviet. The documents are divided by year into three parts: groups of documents for 1915, 1916, and 1917. Thematically, the documents are divided into the following groups:

An important source for our work is the first collection of Russian official sources on the Armenian Genocide, edited by G. A. Abrahamyan and T. G. Sevan-Khachatryan^[6], which reflects not only advanced Russian thought – articles by public and political figures, and writers’ statements – but also documents from the State and Foreign Policy Archives

of Russia. The materials in the collection are presented chronologically and reflect the events of 1915–1916.

We should also note the collection of treaties edited by G. G. Azatyan^[7], in which we find the key treaties of fateful significance for the Armenian people – from the Treaties of Gulistan (1813), Turkmenchay (1828), and Adrianople (1829) to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia signed on August 29, 1997. Despite the nearly two-hundred-year span covered by the collection, it contains few documents, but all of them are of primary importance to us.

Russia and neighboring countries through its own correspondents, subsidiary agencies, and partners (www.regnum.ru);

• Lenta.ru – an online news publication (www.lenta.ru); • Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK) – the most popular Russian newspaper, published in all major cities of Russia, with daily updated articles, reviews, and commentary, and its own newswire (www.mk.ru);

• The Armenian National Institute (ANI) – a non-profit organization in Washington, D.C., USA. The institute’s primary mission is research and lobbying for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The institute’s website has published a large

The Armenian Question – a diplomatic term associated with the Armenian people’s struggle for liberation from Turkish domination, for self-determination and the right to establish their own statehood – entered common usage and became part of the Eastern Question after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 had special significance for the Armenian people, who sought liberation from the Turkish yoke and the freedom of both parts of Armenia under Russia’s protectorate. In January 1878 the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, Nerses Varzhapetyan, presented a document to the National Assembly outlining a program of Armenian self-government modeled on Lebanon (which since 1864 had been governed by a Christian governor). This program – likely dictated by the Turkish government and England (which preferred such a solution to the Russian occupation of Western Armenia) – was rejected. Under pressure from Armenian political circles in Constantinople and the Caucasus, which linked the liberation of the Western Armenians to Russia, the Patriarch of Constantinople, initially through his representatives and then personally, entered into contacts with the Russian command and diplomats and sent a petition to the Russian Emperor Alexander II. At the same time, on the initiative of Armenian public figure G. Artsruni, a petition was presented to the Viceroy of the Caucasus. The Russian government agreed to include a special clause regarding the Armenians in the RussoTurkish peace treaty. Thus Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano was born. For the first time, the Armenian Question received official recognition in a peace treaty – signed at San Stefano on March 3, 1878 – according to which the Sublime Porte undertook “…to carry out

Striving to draw the attention of the European powers at the Berlin Congress to the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, to place the Armenian Question on the agenda, and to secure the implementation by the Turkish government of the promised reforms under the San Stefano Treaty, Armenian political circles in Constantinople sent a national delegation headed by Mkrtich Khrimian to Berlin. However, they were not allowed to participate in the Congress. The delegation presented to the Congress a project for the self-governance of Western Armenia and a memorandum addressed to the Great Powers, which likewise were not taken into account.

The situation of the Armenian people in Turkey, their struggle for liberation, the Armenian Question (which had arisen since the 1878 Berlin Congress), and the diplomatic maneuvers of the Powers around this issue – as well as the Armenian Genocide and its international recognition – have found broad reflection in Russian historiography. In Russian historical literature, there are few specialized works devoted solely to these issues, but they are covered in many works on the history of Russia, military history, and the history of international relations – especially in works on the Eastern Question and the history of Turkey – as well as in a number of published document collections.

In books published after the war and the Berlin Congress (V. A. Abaza’s “History of Armenia”; N. R. Ovsyanny’s “Modern Turkey”; the collection “The Peoples of Turkey”), the dire situation of the Armenians in Turkey during and after the war is shown, as well as the intensification of oppression and violence by the Turkish authorities. The sharp deterioration of the Armenians’ condition in Turkey after the Berlin Congress and the mass massacres of 1894–1896 (which marked the beginning of Turkey’s genocidal policy) aroused a powerful wave of protest in Russia and a public movement to defend the Armenians’ rights – something reflected in historical literature.

In Russian historical literature of the early 20th century and the eve of World War I, during the formation of new alliances in Europe, such issues were reflected as the rise to power of

the Young Turks in 1908 and their policy toward the Armenian population; the intensification of Russia’s policy, in particular toward Turkey (Russia’s initiative and sustained efforts to implement reforms in Western Armenia in 1912–1914); and the renewed heightened interest in Russia in the fate of the Armenians associated with all these events.

In the works of I. I. Goluboyko (“Old and New Turkey”; “Turkey”), events associated with the massacres of Armenians in Sasun and other places are illuminated. Statistical data are given on the enormous number of victims and the destruction during the massacres of 1894–1896; the dire condition of the Armenians in Turkey under the Young Turk regime is shown; and their policy toward Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities is analyzed. These issues are also covered in articles by V. Vodovozov, A. Kaufman, and others published in the Turkish Compendium, as well as in works by historians S. Goryainov (“The Bosporus and the Dardanelles”), I. R. Bazhenov (“Our Foreign Policy in the Near East from a National Perspective”), and M. Mikhailov (“The Bloody Sultan”), and so on.

Of significant interest is the article by Academician B. A. Turaev “Russia and the Christian East”, published in issue 3 of the collection “Russia and Her Allies in the Struggle for Civilization” in 1916, in which the author acquaints the reader with the history and culture of Armenia and Russo-Armenian ties, recounts the Russo-Turkish wars and the participation of Armenians in them, and writes about the San Stefano Treaty and the 1878 Berlin Treaty – noting that Article 61 gave “the Porte the signal for systematic massacre and extermination”^[38] of the Armenian people – and emphasizes the importance of the liberation of Western Armenia and the preservation of its historical monuments for Russian historical science.

In the works of F. A. Rotshtein^[22] (“International Relations at the End of the 19th Century”; “The Seizure and Enslavement of Egypt”; relevant chapters of “A History of Diplomacy”; and a number of articles), many issues are examined relating to the policy of the European Powers at the end of the 19th century toward the fate of the Armenian people. Noting the self-interested aims of the Europeans – particularly British diplomacy – Rotshtein arrives at the just conclusion that as a result of the sharp rivalries among the European Powers, the implementation of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty (on reforms in Turkish Armenia) was effectively left to Turkey’s discretion, and the interests of the Armenian people were forgotten.

German diplomacy is exposed, and the true role of the German government is shown – as accomplice and patron in carrying out the bloody plans to exterminate the Armenians in Turkey.

Valuable sources for studying the history of the Ottoman Empire, Western Armenia, the policies of the European Powers and the USA regarding the Armenian Question, and the massacres of 1894–1896 are studies by American missionaries: E. Bliss (“Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities”), S. Hamlin (“The Armenian Massacres”; “The Martyrdom of an Nation”; “The Genesis and Evolution of the Policy of Turkish Massacres of Armenian Subjects”), F. Greene (“The Armenian Crisis in Turkey: The Massacres of 1894”; “The Armenian Massacres”), as well as works by journalists L. Abbott (“The Armenian Question”), and E. Godkin (“The Armenian Troubles”; “The Armenian Atrocities”).

The campaign by the Turkish authorities and Turkish historical scholarship to falsify history and discredit the issue of the Armenian Genocide has gained support from certain American political scientists and historians. Examples of tendentious – even outright falsified – portrayals of historical events include works like Stanford J. Shaw’s “History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey” and K. Karpat’s “The Politics of Turkey”. In 1986 the Turkish-American Association in Washington published “The Armenian Allegation: Myth and Reality,” with a foreword by Turkey’s U.S. ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, which is a compendium of tendentious anti-Armenian materials that distort the history of the Armenian Question.

(“The Eastern Question: Facts and Fictions”), S. Abgar (“The Armenians and the Eastern Question”), the Duke of Argyll (“The Eastern Question from the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Berlin Treaty 1878”), James Bryce (“The Future of Asiatic Turkey”), I. Whittaker (“The Prospects of Asiatic Turkey”), T. Holland (“The European Concert in the Eastern Question”), and M. Swasie (“The Armenian Question”). These works reflect the British public’s concern for the fate of the Ottoman Armenians and offer judgments and proposals regarding the future arrangement of Western Armenia, the necessity of implementing reforms to improve the Christian population’s conditions, and the fulfillment by the Powers of their obligations under the 1878 Berlin Treaty.

Issues concerning the condition of the Armenian population of Turkey on the eve of World War I – the internal policy of the Young Turk government, the massacres in Adana in 1909, the discussion of reforms in Western Armenia in 1912–1914, and the Powers’ policies on the Armenian Question at this new stage – are covered in the articles and books of E. Pears (“Turkey and Its Peoples”; “Turkey and the War”), F. Cavendish (“Danger in Armenia”), E. Robinson (“The Truth about Armenia”), E. Ferriman (“The Young Turks and the Truth about the Adana Massacre of April 1909”), M. Price (“The Problem of Asiatic Turkey”), and F. Sketchley (“The Armenian Question”).

The policies of Great Britain and other powers toward Armenia, and discussions of the Armenian Question in the British Government and Parliament and at postwar international conferences, are the subject of works by the aforementioned James Bryce (“The Future of Armenia”; “The Settlement of the Near East”), G. Buxton (“Armenia and the Settlement”), S. Lees (“Armenia and the Allies”), I. Pitt (Pittling) (“The Armenian Question in the House of Commons”), J. Marriott (“The Eastern Question in European Diplomacy”), G. Mikhaelyan (“The Future of the Armenians”), R. Roade (“Armenia: British Commitments and the Near East”), and A. Safrastian (“Germany and Armenia”).

A certain contribution to the historiography of the problem was made by the works of A. Adossidès (“The Armenians and the Young Turks: The Cilician Massacre”), René Pinon (“The Extermination of the Armenians: A German Method, a Turkish Work”), and Jacques de Morgan (“Against the Barbarians of the East”). A significant portion of these works is descriptive; the authors relate the dire condition of the Armenians in their ancestral homeland (Western Armenia) and their cruel oppression, without delving into an analysis of the socio-economic and political causes. An anti-German tendency predominates – an effort to show that Imperial Germany, as Turkey’s ally, was an accomplice in the crime. Some authors, such as Pierre Loti and Claude Farrère, supported the official Turkish version of an allegedly “general Armenian uprising,” trying to cast the blame for what happened on the victims themselves.

French literature of this period also portrayed the heroic self-defense by the Armenians of Sasun, Van, Shapin-Garahisar, Urfa, and on Mount Musa. The French public was moved by accounts of Armenian resistance against overwhelming odds during the massacres.

Particularly valuable are the works that provide a fully documented, balanced assessment of the Armenian Genocide. These include Jean-Marie Carzou’s and Yves Ternon’s studies, which firmly established in Western scholarship that the 1915 slaughter of the Armenians constituted genocide. Ternon emphasizes that the Young Turks’ crimes were driven by extreme nationalist and Pan-Turkic ideology: by eliminating the Armenians, the Young Turks believed they were removing an obstacle to unifying all Turkic peoples from the Ottoman Empire to Central Asia.

One of the first testimonies by a German eyewitness to the massacres was the appeal of Martin Niepage, who from 1912–16 was a teacher at the German technical school in Aleppo – “A Few Words to the Official Representatives of the German People.” Previously published in French and English, this appeal exposed the Young Turks’ crimes and blamed Germany for its policy on the Armenian Question.

In the work of the orientalist Joseph Markwart “The Rise and Rebirth of the Armenian Nation,” it was concluded that the Ottoman government viewed the approach of world war as the most favorable moment to carry out its long-contemplated plan to exterminate the Armenians, and that the main slogan of Turkey’s ruling circles, even after the constitution was proclaimed, remained: “When there are no Armenians, there will be no Armenian Question.” The author noted that the Young Turks in their brutality yielded in nothing to Abdul Hamid. Markwart strongly condemned the German government, general staff, and press, which, in his view, were also responsible for the Armenian Genocide.

One notable post-war development was the publication of key German diplomatic archives concerning the Armenian Genocide. In 1919, Lepsius had already published “Germany and Armenia: 1914–1918,” a collection of secret German diplomatic documents that demonstrated the German authorities’ full knowledge of the Young Turks’ murderous intent and methods. Much later, in 2005, Wolfgang Gust published a comprehensive collection of German Foreign Office documents on the Armenian Genocide (translated into English in 2014), further substantiating the genocidal intent and execution as seen by Germany’s own representatives.

To this group of Turkish literature can be added the memoirs of the direct organizers of the Armenian Genocide: Talaat Pasha’s “Memoirs”, Cemal Pasha’s “Memoirs”, the CUP party secretary Şükrü Bleda’s “The Collapse of the Empire”, as well as the historian Ahmed Refik’s “On the Roads of the Caucasus.” The authors of these works do not deny the fact of the mass killings of Armenians, but they dispute the organized, intentional character of this crime. They portray events as if the Armenians, with the help of Turkey’s enemies (primarily Russia), were preparing to destroy the Turks; therefore, they argue, the deportation and massacre of the Armenians were only a lawful and natural act of self-defense by the Turkish population.

Turkish historians assert that, starting in the 1870s, under the influence of Russian and British intrigues, the Armenians began activities against their “benefactors” – the Turks – and formed various committees and organizations whose activities were directed against the Turks. The Armenians allegedly aimed to partition and destroy the Ottoman Empire. Mutual massacres ensued, for which the primary responsibility, they argue, lies with Russia, which was pursuing its own selfish political goals. This view is held by historians like Altay Deliorman (“Armenian Revolutionaries Against the Turks”), Cemal Anadol (“The Armenian File”), and Alper Gülener (“At the Origins of Armenian Terrorism”).

Nonetheless, critical voices in Turkey have also emerged. From the late 20th century onward, a few courageous Turkish scholars, journalists, and intellectuals began to challenge the official line. They pointed to the abundant evidence of centrally organized mass murder. Some, like Taner Akçam – often considered the first Turkish historian to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide – have utilized Ottoman archives to demonstrate the Young Turk regime’s intent to destroy the Armenians. This very limited opening of Turkish historiography has come at personal cost to those involved (legal prosecution, academic marginalization, or worse), but it marks a beginning of re-examining historical truth within Turkey.

The failure of the Great Powers to ensure real reforms (and the substitution of Russia’s protection with vague international guarantees) meant that the Armenian Question became a tool of imperial diplomacy rather than a matter of genuine humanitarian

concern. The Berlin Congress marked a turning point: it internationalized the Armenian Question, but also sowed Armenian disillusionment with European diplomacy. Indeed, Armenian activists, seeing that European promises had not translated into tangible protections, turned increasingly inward, concluding that only armed struggle could secure the liberation of Western Armenia.

In the Armenian Question, the autocratic ruler saw a grave danger to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He had no intention of resolving it in the manner of the Bulgarian Question (through autonomy or independence), nor of granting Armenians any selfgovernment like that enjoyed by the Maronites of Lebanon. The Sultan aimed instead to deprive the Armenians of even the limited self-rule that their communities had traditionally exercised in religious and local matters. When creating new administrative districts (vilayets) in Western Armenia, the Ottoman authorities tried to partition the territory such that in none of the districts would Armenians constitute a majority of the population^[39].

The Ottoman Empire’s internal contradictions, the presence of numerous objective and subjective obstacles to capitalist development, and the colonial policies of the advanced European states all exacerbated the empire’s crisis. Sultan Abdul Hamid II sought an escape from this complex and desperate situation. He adopted the doctrine of PanIslamism as the instrument of his policy – a doctrine preaching the unification of all Muslims and intolerance toward the national liberation movements of the subjugated peoples. However, despite all the Sultan’s efforts, the measures taken in the 1890s to rally the Muslim world around the Sultan’s authority did not meet with success. Within the Ottoman Empire, national awakening was growing among all the subject peoples; their national consciousness was rising steadily.

The Hamidian massacres were followed by a brief respite, but the underlying policy persisted. Sultan Abdul Hamid’s view – cynically phrased as “the way to get rid of the Armenian Question is to get rid of the Armenians” – had become entrenched in Ottoman ruling circles. Indeed, Abdul Hamid reportedly once declared that the best solution to the Armenian Question was the complete annihilation of the Armenians. His reign earned him the nickname “Red Sultan” for the rivers of blood spilled under his orders.

In July 1908, the Young Turk Revolution took place: a nationalist reformist movement (the Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) forced Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the Ottoman constitution of 1876. Initially, this event was greeted with optimism by the empire’s subject peoples, including the Armenians. Constitutional slogans of “freedom, equality, and justice” raised hopes among Armenians that decades of oppression might finally end. The Armenian political parties, notably the Dashnaktsutyun, even entered into a period of cooperation with the Young Turks, believing that equal citizenship in a reformed Ottoman state was possible.

was bleak: constitutional proclamations meant little if the state could not – or would not – protect Armenians from massacre.

The Adana Massacres of 1909 effectively shattered Armenian trust in the Young Turk government. Many Dashnak and Hnchak activists realized that, despite the CUP’s liberal rhetoric, the old patterns of violence and impunity continued. Crucially, some within the Young Turk leadership itself began to conclude that the Armenians’ aspirations (even peaceful ones for reform or autonomy) were incompatible with their own plans to “Turkify” and centralize the empire.

In short, the Adana Massacres of 1909 highlighted that even the Young Turk revolution failed to eradicate anti-Armenian hatred. Instead, within a few years, the same Young Turk leaders – now hardened by war and embittered by the empire’s fragility – would embark on a far more comprehensive and systematic campaign against their Armenian subjects.

World War I provided the cover and catalyst for the Ottoman government’s decision to carry out the genocide of the Armenians. By late 1914, after the Ottoman entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the Young Turk triumvirate (Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior; Enver Pasha, Minister of War; and Cemal Pasha, Minister of the Navy) had already set in motion plans to remove the Armenian population, whom they viewed as a potential fifth column aiding the Russians.

In early 1915, Armenian soldiers serving in the Ottoman army were disarmed and segregated into labor battalions – and in most cases, subsequently murdered by Ottoman

By late 1915, the Armenian population of most of Western Armenia and Anatolia had been effectively wiped out – through massacres, starvation, exhaustion, or disease. The few who survived did so by converting to Islam or through the rare intervention of a righteous local official or neighbor, or they managed by luck or resourcefulness to escape beyond Ottoman borders. The American ambassador in Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., and other neutral observers reported back to the world detailing the systematic nature of what was happening. Morgenthau famously wrote: “When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race.” Ottoman statesmen themselves were aware of what they were doing. Talaat Pasha boasted to Ambassador Morgenthau in late 1915: “I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian Question in three months than Abdul Hamid accomplished in thirty years.”^[171] He added, chillingly, “There are no more Armenians.”

After World War I, the defeated Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920), which included provisions for an independent Armenian state on Ottoman territory – a hope briefly kindled for survivors. However, the Turkish Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal rejected the Treaty of Sèvres outright. During the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923), Kemalist forces not only fought European occupying armies but also attacked the new Republic of Armenia to the east. In late 1920, Turkish Nationalist troops seized the Armenian-held territories of Kars and Ardahan and forced the dismemberment of the Armenian Republic. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne established the modern Republic of Turkey’s borders and notably contained no provisions regarding Armenians (or other Christians) beyond minimal general minority rights.

Kemalism’s resolution of the Armenian Question – in practice, the non-existence of an Armenian Question due to the near non-existence of Armenians in Turkey – had grave implications. It meant that for decades, the justice sought by Armenians for the genocide was deferred, and the consequences of that genocide (the diaspora’s dispersal, the trauma, the lost homeland) remained unaddressed. The legacy of Kemalism in this regard endures: to this day, the Republic of Turkey, while a very different state in many ways from the Ottoman Empire, maintains an unbroken policy of genocide denial and nonrecognition of Armenian national rights.

These assassinations, although acts of vigilante justice, resonated deeply. They demonstrated the intense desire among Armenians to hold the genocide’s orchestrators accountable. The most dramatic was Tehlirian’s trial. By finding him not guilty, the German court implicitly condemned Talaat Pasha’s crimes. One of the trial’s expert witnesses, Johannes Lepsius, had testified to Talaat’s direct responsibility for the extermination of the Armenians, and the trial transcripts helped spread awareness of the genocide in Europe^[171].

To Armenians worldwide, Operation Nemesis provided a measure of cathartic justice. The official Allied efforts to prosecute Ottoman war criminals (through the Malta tribunals) had faltered and ultimately failed under pressure from the Turkish Nationalists and shifting British interests. The Dashnak avengers took it upon themselves to do what international courts would not – an extraordinary, though controversial, episode in the post-genocide period.

In the diaspora communities (in countries like France, the United States, Lebanon, Argentina, and elsewhere), Armenians tirelessly worked to keep the memory alive. Churches, charitable organizations, and cultural associations erected memorials and held commemoration ceremonies every April 24. The Armenian Apostolic Church canonized the martyrs of 1915 in the immediate aftermath, ensuring that within Armenian national consciousness the victims were remembered as saints and heroes of faith.

From the 1960s onward, as a new generation of genocide survivors’ descendants came of age – and as the 50th anniversary in 1965 approached – a wave of renewed activism arose. In 1965, large demonstrations took place in Beirut, Los Angeles, and especially in Yerevan (then in Soviet Armenia) where a huge crowd gathered – unprecedented in the USSR – to demand justice and honor the victims. That same year, Uruguay became the first country in the world to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide (by a parliamentary resolution). This marked the beginning of a slow but growing trend of recognition.

Throughout these efforts, it was often diaspora organizations (like the Armenian National Committees and the Armenian Assembly of America) lobbying foreign governments, and non-state voices – journalists, scholars, human rights advocates – that advanced the cause of recognition, sometimes well ahead of formal state actions.

By the early 21st century, April 24 commemoration events were being held in many major cities around the world, often with the participation of local officials, reflecting a broadening acknowledgment among civil society. In 2015, on the genocide’s centennial, high-profile memorial concerts, exhibitions, and conferences took place globally (for instance, a 100th anniversary concert in Istanbul itself – albeit titled “Great Catastrophe” given political sensitivities – indicated remarkable non-state engagement within Turkey, led by civic activists and brave intellectuals).

In summary, long before governments took formal steps, the Armenian Genocide was recognized and kept in the global conscience by a coalition of non-state actors: the Armenian Church, diaspora institutions, genocide scholars, human rights organizations, the United Nations’ expert panels, and others. Their persistent work laid the groundwork for the political recognitions that would follow.

recognized the genocide and has since built a memorial and included the history in curricula.

• Belgium (1998) – the Senate of Belgium passed a resolution recognizing the

genocide^[104].

• France (1998/2001) – France has been a leader in recognition. In 1998, the National Assembly recognized the Armenian Genocide; in January 2001, France passed a law stating simply “France publicly recognizes the Armenian Genocide of 1915”^[125][127]. Later, in 2019, France designated April 24 as a national day of commemoration.

Italy (2000) – the Italian Chamber of Deputies adopted a motion recognizing the genocide^[109].

1975 and 1984, the US House of Representatives approved commemorative resolutions (House Joint Resolution 148 in 1975 and House Joint Resolution 247 in 1984) marking April 24, 1915, as the anniversary of the genocide^[120][121]. These were not binding laws and faced resistance in the Senate. Over the years, many US states (49 of 50 states as of 2020) recognized the genocide individually. Finally, in 2019, both houses of the US Congress passed near-unanimous resolutions formally recognizing the Armenian Genocide – a historic achievement after decades of Armenian-American lobbying.

By 2020, over 30 countries had formally recognized the events of 1915 as genocide through parliamentary resolutions, laws, or executive statements. These include most of Western Europe, many countries of Eastern Europe, North and South America, and Australia. International organizations like the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (1998)^[131] and the Mercosur Parliament (2007) have also done so. Even in the Middle East, where governments have been more cautious, Syria’s parliament in 2015 recognized the genocide.

Despite the mounting historical evidence and international recognition, the Turkish state continues to officially deny that the events of 1915 constituted genocide. Turkey’s position, essentially unchanged for decades, is that there was no premeditated campaign to destroy the Armenian population – rather, the deaths of Armenians occurred in the

context of civil unrest, wartime conditions, and local retaliations for Armenian “rebellion.” This stance of denial is a central issue impeding Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and remains a source of tension in Turkey’s foreign relations.

The roots of Turkey’s denial are intertwined with national identity. In the narrative taught in Turkey, the Armenians are portrayed as disloyal subjects who formed fifth columns, especially in eastern Anatolia, attempting to align with invading Russian armies during WWI. According to the official line, the Ottoman government had to relocate Armenians for their own safety and the empire’s security, and unfortunately many Armenians died – but due to famine, disease, or rogue actions, not due to a planned extermination policy. Moreover, the Turkish narrative emphasizes Turkish and Muslim suffering during WWI, including casualties and expulsions in the Balkans and Caucasus, often framing the discourse as “all peoples suffered in those times.”

Another modern development is that Armenia-Turkey relations are effectively frozen largely due to this issue (and also Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict). In 2009, under Swiss auspices, Turkey and Armenia signed protocols to normalize relations

and open their border (which Turkey closed in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan). These protocols did not explicitly demand Turkey recognize the genocide, but domestic opposition in both countries – especially the perception in Armenia that normalization without recognition betrayed the cause of genocide justice – prevented ratification. The process stalled, demonstrating that without addressing the genocide dispute, full reconciliation is elusive.

The policy of Turkey’s rulers – in particular the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Young Turks, and the Kemalists – aimed at the extermination of the Armenians cannot be confined to the late 19th century and the World War I years alone. Historical facts show that mass violence against the Armenians occurred over the course of decades, even centuries. On the one hand, it took the form of forced assimilation – under the pressure of an intolerant state religion. Armenians were forcibly converted, forbidden from speaking their language (even in their homes), and their children were taken and “Turkified” at sword-point (thousands of Armenian boys were seized and raised as Turks, and young women were abducted into harems). On the other hand, it ultimately took the form of

As R. Saakian correctly observed in his book “From the History of the Genocide,” one of the motives was economic: “It is known that the Western Armenian commercial bourgeoisie, capitalists and industrialists – by their talent and entrepreneurship, even under conditions of autocracy and arbitrariness – managed to acquire considerable wealth in Turkey and accumulate capital, eventually investing it in the development of that country. The elimination of all Armenians, without class distinction, allowed the Young Turk killers to steal their assets, on the pretext that the perished Armenians were Ottoman citizens and thus their property, as inheritance, should pass to the Turkish state.”^[172].

Referring to the words of Professor Yuri Barsegov in an interview with Armen Khanbabyan, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”^[174], we can draw some conclusions regarding recognition of the genocide. The fact of the Armenian Genocide – as well as the political responsibility of the Turkish state for this “crime against humanity” – was duly established by the international community at the time the crime was being committed.

Already during the genocide’s first stage (the Hamidian period), the actions of the Turks led to a humanitarian intervention by the Great Powers. The security of the Armenian population in the empire’s Armenian provinces became an international obligation of Turkey under the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano (February 19, 1878) and the Berlin Treaty that superseded it (July 13, 1878). The political existence of Turkey’s Armenians – their right to life, and the inviolability of their person and property – were placed under the protection of international law and under the supervision of the Great Powers.

Unfortunately, due to sharp contradictions among the Great Powers, the promises of Sèvres were not fulfilled. The European states’ selfish interests meant that enforcement of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty regarding reforms in Turkish Armenia was effectively left to Turkey’s discretion – and the interests of the Armenian people were forgotten^[169]. With the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) by which Turkey re-entered the international community, the Armenian Question was intentionally omitted, essentially burying the issue at a diplomatic level for decades.

For more than a quarter century after Lausanne, silence reigned in Armenian historiography regarding the problems of the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide – a silence broken by the 1955 publication of M. G. Nersisyan’s monograph “The Liberational Struggle of the Armenian People against Turkish Despotism, 1850–1870.” Using a large amount of factual material, that work examined a whole series of issues related to the content and manifestations of the Armenian Question during the period studied: the dire situation of the Western Armenians, the Armenian liberation movement, its ideology, socio-class nature, and the programmatic goals of its driving forces; the connections of this movement with the anti-Sultan aspirations of other peoples of the Ottoman Empire; and the policies of the European Powers toward the Armenian liberation movement. The author overcame the erroneous assessments of Raffi, Patkanian and other ideologues of the Armenian liberation movement that had prevailed in Soviet Armenian historiography, revealing their great role in shaping the ideology of the national liberation struggle. Besides this work – which stimulated scholarly research into the history of the Western Armenians’ liberation movement and the Armenian Question as a whole – Nersisyan penned a series of articles on the Zeitun uprising of 1862, the massacres of the Western Armenians, the activities of the Armenian national hero Andranik^[17], and other topics.

Many English authors warned the British Government of the threat of physical extermination hanging over the Armenians of Turkey on the eve of World War I. World War I and the Armenian Genocide in Turkey heightened interest in the Armenian Question in British historiography. Valuable publications of documents appeared – on the Armenians’ condition in Turkey during the war, the genocide and deportations of the Western Armenians – notably, the document collections by J. Bryce “The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916”, and A. Toynbee “Documents on the Treatment of Armenians and Assyrian Christians in the Ottoman Empire and NorthWestern Persia.”.

Online Resources:

• www.anca.org (Armenian National Committee of America) • www.armenian-genocide.org (Armenian National Institute) • www.armtown.com (News portal on Armenian issues) • www.bbc.co.uk (BBC News) • www.day.az (Azerbaijani news site) • www.golos.am (Golos Armenii – “Voice of Armenia” newspaper) • www.izvestia.ru (Izvestia Russian news) • www.lenta.ru (Lenta.ru Russian news portal) • www.mk.ru (Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper) • www.ng.ru (Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper) • www.panarmenian.net (PanARMENIAN News) • www.pravoteka.ru (Pravoteka legal documents) • www.rbc.ru (RosBiznesKonsalting news agency) • www.regnum.ru (REGNUM News Agency) • www.rian.ru (RIA Novosti News Agency) • www.rus.nl (Russian Netherlands news)

Books, Articles, and Documents:

• Abrahamyan, G. A. & Sevan-Khachatryan, T. G. Russian Sources on the Genocide of

Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916: Collection of Documents and Materials. Yerevan, 1995.

• Agayan, Ts. P. Russia in the Fate of the Armenians and Armenia. Moscow, 1978. • Azatyan, G. G. Fateful Treaties. Yerevan, 2000. • Akopyan, S. “Interethnic Relations in Western Armenia during World War I.” –

Izvestia NAS Arm. SSR (Social Sciences), No. 6, Yerevan, 1962.

• Armenia. Marseille, No. 126, 1890. • The Armenian Question: Encyclopedia. Yerevan, 1991. • Bagdasaryan, R. The Genocide and the Armenian Intelligentsia of Russia. Yerevan,

• Barsegov, Yu. G. The Armenian Genocide – A Crime under International Law.

Moscow, 2000.

• Barsegov, Yu. G. The Armenian Genocide: Turkey’s Responsibility and Obligations of the World Community. Documents and Commentary. Vol. 1, 2 parts. Moscow, 2002.

• Barsegov, Yu. G. The Turkish Doctrine of International Law in the Service of

Genocide Policy. Moscow, 2002.

• Bogaturov, A. D. Systematic History of International Relations. Vol. 1. Moscow,

• Brotherly Aid to Armenians Suffering in Turkey. Moscow, 1898. • Vasiliev, L. S. History of the East. Vol. 2. Moscow, 2005. • Byzantine Heritage, No. 3, 2002. • Gust, Wolfgang. The Armenian Genocide 1915–1916: Documents from the Political

Archive of the German Foreign Office. Yerevan, 2006.

• Grant, E. The Armenian Question Yesterday and Today. Moscow, 1992. • Golos Armenii, December 2008; January, February, March 2009 (issues of the

newspaper in those months).

• Dadrian, V. N. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Yerevan (Armenian translation), 2005.

• Guaita, Giovanni. Islam Is Not Complicit in Their Deeds: Sheikh Fayez el-Hussein on

the Armenian Genocide. Moscow, 2007.

• Lloyd George, David. The Truth about the Peace Treaties. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1957. • Lang, David. The Armenians: A People in Exile. Moscow, 2006 (Russian translation). • Zakarian, A. A. The Tragedy of the Armenian People in the Evaluations of Russian

Writers. Yerevan, 2003. Izvestia (newspaper), No. 205 (469), September 21, 1918.

• • Kazarian, G. M. The Genocide of the Armenian People in the Ottoman Empire.

Yerevan, 2004.

• Kinyapina, N. S. Russia in the 18th–20th Centuries: Pages of History. Moscow, 2000. • Kirakosyan, A. J. Great Britain and the Armenian Question. Yerevan, 1990. • Kirakosyan, A. J. The Armenian Question in the Pages of British Journals (mid-

1890s). Yerevan, 1980.

• Kirakosyan, A. J. On the Question of the Constantinople Massacre of 1896. – Literary

Armenia, No. 4, 1989.

• Kirakosyan, A. J. England’s Policy on the Armenian Question (Based on the Weekly

“Spectator”). Yerevan, 1982.

• Kirakosyan, J. S. Western Armenia in the Years of World War I. Yerevan, 1971. • Kirakosyan, J. S. The Young Turks before the Judgment of History. Yerevan, 1989. • Markaryan, E. S. Global Aspects of the Armenian Genocide: A Cultural Analysis.

Yerevan, 2005.

• Marukyan, A. The Armenian Question and Russia’s Policy, 1915–1917. Yerevan,

• Marukyan, A. Russia and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917: Collection of

Documents. Yerevan, 2004.

• Miller, A. F. The Ottoman Empire (Sultanate of Turkey). Lecture Notes of the Higher

Party School at the CPSU Central Committee. Moscow, 1946.

• Nersisyan, M. G. The Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Collection of

Documents and Materials. Yerevan, 1982. • Nor Kyank (newspaper), London, No. 15, 1900. • Ogandjianian, A. 1915: Irrefutable Evidence. Austrian Documents on the Armenian

Genocide. St. Petersburg, 2005.

• Ohanesian, N. The Armenian Genocide. Yerevan, 2005. • Ohanyan, P. The Genocide of the Armenian People and the Defense of Human

Rights. Yerevan, 2004.

• Otyan, Yervant. Collected Works. Vol. 4 (in Armenian). Yerevan, 1962. • Paramaz (Matteos Sarkisian). Life and Activity. Providence, RI, 1954. • Petrosyan, G. S. The Armenian Question and Armenian-Russian Relations at the

Start of the 20th Century. Moscow, 1996.

• Russia: A Complete Encyclopedic Illustrated Handbook. Moscow, 2002. • Rotstein, A. F. (ed.). The Diary of V. N. Lamzdorf. – Red Archive (Krasny Arkhiv),

Vol. 3. Moscow-Leningrad, 1931.

• Sakayan, Dora. Smyrna 1922: The Diary of an Armenian Doctor (Garbis Hatcherian).

Yerevan, 2005.

• Sapah-Gulian, S. The Guilty Ones. Providence, RI, 1916. • Tumanyan, Hovhannes. Collected Works. Vol. 4. Yerevan, 1969. • Tunian, V. G. The Young Turks and the Armenian Question. Vols. 1–2. Yerevan, 2004. • Nansen, Fridtjof. Armenia and the Near East. Moscow, 1994. • Churchill, Winston. The World Crisis. Moscow-Leningrad, 1932 (Russian

translation).

• Armenia (newspaper, in Armenian), No. 68, 1889.

[^1]: “Who remembers the annihilation of the Armenians today?” – Adolf Hitler’s rhetorical question posed on August 22, 1939, at Obersalzberg, implying that world indifference to the Armenian Genocide emboldened his plans^[1].

[^35]: Treaty of San Stefano (1878), Article 16 and Treaty of Berlin (1878), Article 61 – obligating the Ottoman government to implement reforms for Armenians and ensure their security^[37].

[^36]: Le France (Paris newspaper) commentary, later quoted, noting England’s cynical use of the Armenian Question for its own interests^[36].

[^37]: Quotation of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty (1878) – “The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local needs in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to ensure their security from Kurds and Circassians. It will periodically inform the Powers about the measures taken to this end, and the Powers will supervise their application.”^[37].

[^38]: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 301 – describing the Ottoman Empire’s “rotting” condition in the 1890s^[38].

[^39]: Eastern Question in European Diplomacy – British journalist James Bryce’s observation on Ottoman policy of dividing Armenian-inhabited regions to prevent an Armenian majority anywhere^[39].

[^40]: Walter B. Harris, British reporter in 1895, concluded that the Hamidiye’s depredations were part of a deliberate Ottoman policy to force Armenians to emigrate^[40].

[^41]: The Spectator (London), 1891 – warning that Ottoman authorities were preparing a general massacre of Armenians and calling for intervention^[41].

[^97]: Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, 1918 – recounting Talaat’s boast: “I have accomplished more in three months to solve the Armenian Question than Abdul Hamid did in thirty years. No Armenians remain.”^[171].

[^102]: Allied Powers’ Joint Declaration of May 24, 1915 – condemning Ottoman “crimes against humanity and civilization” toward Armenians^[102].

[^118]: Russian State Duma Resolution, April 14, 1995 – officially recognizing the Armenian Genocide and memorializing its victims^[118].

[^119]: The Cypriot House of Representatives, Resolution 1975 – one of the earliest parliamentary recognitions of the Armenian Genocide.

[^120]: U.S. House Joint Resolution 148, adopted April 8, 1975 – designating April 24, 1975 as “National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man,” with special reference to the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians^[120].

[^121]: U.S. House Joint Resolution 247, adopted September 10, 1984 – commemorating the Armenian Genocide and restating Congress’s recognition^[121].

[^125]: Republic of France, Law No. 2001-70 of January 29, 2001 – “France publicly recognizes the Armenian Genocide of 1915.”^[125].

[^127]: European Parliament Resolution, June 18, 1987 – stating that the Armenian massacres met the definition of genocide and urging Turkey’s recognition^[133]; European Parliament Resolution, April 15, 2015 – marking the genocide’s centennial and urging Turkey to reconcile with its past^[136].

[^129]: Swiss National Council, Motion of December 16, 2003 – recognizing the Armenian Genocide^[129].

[^131]: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1047 (1994) – on the Armenian population’s fate and urging recognition (though not explicitly using “genocide”).

[^133]: European Parliament Resolution, June 18, 1987 – affirming the Armenian Genocide and linking Turkey’s EU accession to its acknowledgment^[133].

[^134]: European Parliament Resolution, November 15, 2000 – reaffirming earlier positions and urging Turkey to recognize the genocide^[134].

[^137]: UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, August 29, 1985 (Whitaker Report) – listing the Armenian Genocide among genocides of the 20th century^[137].

[^170]: N. O. Nikoghosyan, “The Armenian Genocide: Evidence and Documents,” Yerevan, 1965, p. 34 – documenting 1.5 million Armenians killed, ~600,000 deported, and ~500,000 refugees per contemporary accounts^[170].

[^171]: Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, 1918, p. 302 – Talaat’s quote about solving the Armenian Question by eliminating Armenians^[171].

[^172]: R. Saakian, “From the History of the Genocide,” Yerevan, 1990, p. 12 – discussing the economic motives behind the Young Turks’ extermination of Armenians (plundering Armenian wealth)^[172].

[^173]: Dr. Bahaeddin Shakir’s statement, as quoted in Aram Andonian’s “The Memoirs of Naim Bey,” Paris, 1920 – “The Armenians pose an obstacle to the sacred ideals of PanTurkism and Pan-Islamism... We must eliminate this obstacle.”^[173].